Very nice work Diego! 

Is there a POC showing the overflow, as that would make writing unit tests easier?

Also is this vulnerability in the same class as other printf vulnerabilities, where it requires a developer to pass untrusted input as the format string to print?

Thank you!
Linted

On Tue, Oct 24, 2023, 7:16 AM Diego Dias <diego.dias@kernkonzept.com> wrote:
Dear uclibc-ng developers,

We have run a static analysis tool (Klocwork) in uclibc and one of its
checkers (ABV.GENERAL) indicates a potential buffer overflow in
uclibc-ng/src/master/libc/stdio/_vfprintf.c:1045

The problem occurs as an out-of-bounds access to array 'argtype', which
is a member of 'ppfs_t'. This array has length 'MAX_ARGS'. According to
the static analysis tool, the array can be accessed using index 'n' of
value '-1' and '9..254' in the conditional shown below:

// File: uclibc-ng/src/master/libc/stdio/_vfprintf.c:1045
   if (_is_equal_or_bigger_arg(ppfs->argtype[n], argtype[i])) {
     ppfs->argtype[n] = argtype[i];
   }

Triggering an out-of-bounds access for 'n=-1' is relatively simply when
using printf or similar functions (e.g. vfprintf). Such out-of-bounds
access occurs when positional arguments are specified, as in the
following statement:

   printf("%1$s", "Hello world!");

Although Klocwork claims that the array might be accessed using indexes
'9..254', we were not able to trigger an out-of-bounds access for
indexes in this range.

Kind regards,
Diego Dias

--
Diego M. Dias, Systems Verification Engineer at Kernkonzept, diego.dias@kernkonzept.com
Phone: +49 351 41883231

Kernkonzept GmbH at Dresden, Germany, HRB 31129, CEO Dr.-Ing. Michael Hohmuth

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